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Abstract Research concerning the impact of positive
mood on cognitive performance is inconsistent. We suggest
that specific self-efficacy moderates this relationship. The
current study proposed that participants in a positive mood
with a high level of specific self-efficacy would anticipate
mood-maintaining success on a task. Hence, they would be
more strongly motivated, and perform better on the task,
than individuals in other moods. Conversely, participants
in a positive mood with low specific self-efficacy should
expect mood-threatening failure. Thus, these individuals
should be less motivated and perform more poorly than
individuals in other moods. The current study included 139
participants with different levels of specific self-efficacy
performing a comprehension task in either a positive or
negative mood or a control condition. Results confirmed
our hypothesis whereby specific self-efficacy affects cog-
nitive performance but only during a positive mood. These
findings support the role of specific self-efficacy in main-
taining positive mood by regulating task activity.
Keywords Mood  Specific self-efficacy  Cognitive
performance
Introduction
Studies investigating cognitive performance during a
positive mood have yielded inconclusive results. Several
studies have shown that positive mood impairs cognitive
performance (Abele 1992; Mackie and Worth 1989;
Schwarz and Clore 1983), while others suggest the oppo-
site pattern (Bohn-Gettler and Rapp 2011; Isen et al. 1987),
when compared to negative mood. To resolve these
inconsistencies, models of potential moderators have been
suggested (Bless et al. 1996; Martin et al. 1993; Wegener
et al. 1995, Ziegler 2014). These moderating models pro-
pose that a positive mood leads to either better or worse
cognitive performance depending on situational circum-
stances (Bless et al. 1996) or regulatory aspects of the
positive mood itself (Martin et al. 1993; Wegener et al.
1995; Ziegler 2014).
In a model proposed by Bless et al. (1996), situational
demands moderate the impact of a positive mood on cog-
nitive performance. Individuals in a positive mood usually
do not efficiently process information because they rely on
general knowledge such as scripts and stereotypes. How-
ever, this does not imply that individuals in a positive
mood are unmotivated or inefficiently process information
in general. They immediately begin efficient processing
when the situation demands it (i.e., when general knowl-
edge is not applicable or when the task is complex).
Martin et al. (1993) proposed a model in which the
moderator is related to regulatory aspects of a positive
mood. According to this mood-as-input model, individuals
can interpret a positive mood differently at both the
beginning and during a task. They might interpret a posi-
tive mood as a sign that they have already performed well
on the task. This interpretation could lead to a withdrawal
of effort and decreased performance. However, individuals
might also regard their positive mood as a sign that they are
enjoying the current task. As such, individuals will put
more effort into the task and improve their performance.
Ziegler (2014) also claims that a mood at the beginning
and during a task might be crucial for processing, although
not as a signal related to formal processing parameters
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(e.g., putting in or withdrawing effort as in Martin et al.’s
account) but as a factor interacting with processing content.
Ziegler claims that individuals create expectancies
regarding processing content based on their mood. If the
information is incongruent with these expectancies, it
might be taken as surprising and processed better. For
example, during a positive mood, individuals expect
pleasant information. If an unpleasant one comes on, it is
incongruent with their mood-based expectancies. Thus, it is
taken as more surprising and processed better than a
pleasant one (unless it impairs the goal of affective
regulation).
Wegener and Petty’s hedonic contingency theory (We-
gener and Petty 1994; Wegener et al. 1995) involves an
even more complex model of moderator related to regu-
latory aspects of a positive mood. Unlike Martin et al.’s
(1993) and Ziegler’s (2014) models, Wegener and Petty
assert that individuals’ performance depends on the mood
not only at input (i.e., at the beginning or during process-
ing) but also at output (i.e., at the end or after processing).
Wegener and Petty assumed that when individuals are in a
positive mood, they effectively process only the material
that is relevant to their mood and aids with mood mainte-
nance. Thus, when in a positive mood, individuals endorse
a strategic approach to information processing and effec-
tively process only information with desirable mood con-
sequences. Conversely, information is processed less
effectively when threatening to a positive mood (Wegener
et al. 1995).
The role of specific self-efficacy (SSE)
The current study is based on a model similar to hedonic
contingency theory. As in this approach, we assume that
individuals in a positive mood strive to maintain this mood.
However, we suggest that factors other than processing
pleasant information also serve this purpose. We hypoth-
esized that individuals maintain their positive mood by
engaging in a task where they feel efficacious. During such
a task, they anticipate success, which could maintain their
positive mood. Therefore, these individuals will be
strongly motivated to perform such a task and achieve
better results. Conversely, if individuals feel inefficient
during a particular task, they might anticipate failure, and
this could dampen their positive mood. These individuals
might be less motivated to perform such tasks when in a
positive mood and could perform worse.
Thus, we predict that specific self-efficacy (SSE) might
moderate the relationship between positive mood and
cognitive performance. SSE in this context is regarded as
an individuals’ belief that they can mobilize motivation,
cognitive resources, and courses of action to meet situa-
tional demands (Wood and Bandura 1989). Thus, unlike
the aforementioned models, SSE works like a trait-based
characteristic (Gupta et al. 2013; Low et al. 2005), influ-
encing the relationship between mood and performance. In
the models described previously, moderators were tempo-
rary circumstances: situational demands in Bless et al.’s
(1996) proposition, current interpretation of the meaning of
a positive mood in Martin et al.’s (1993) model, congru-
ency of ongoing information with mood-based expectations
in Ziegler 2014 approach, and hedonic relevance of
information to the current mood in Wegener and Petty’s
(Wegener et al. 1995) model.
To test our hypothesis, we conducted a study with tree
groups. Two groups received either a positive or negative
mood induction. We also included a control group in which
no particular mood was induced.
We predicted that individuals in a positive mood with
high SSE would anticipate success during a relevant
activity. Here, success can serve to maintain their positive
mood. Therefore, individuals with high SSE while in a
positive mood should be more strongly motivated, and
perform better, than individuals with high SSE performing
the task in other mood conditions.
Conversely, individuals in a positive mood with low
SSE should anticipate failure during a relevant activity.
Failure could impair their mood, leading to less motivation
and poorer performance compared to individuals with low
SSE level performing the task in other mood conditions.
The expectancies of diminished motivation among
individuals with low SSE and enhanced motivation of high
SSE ones are based on Bandura’s work (Bandura 1977). As
high SSE was confirmed to be related to the anticipation of
success, low SSE was proved to be related to a fear of
failure, avoidance motivation, and avoidance coping
responses (Bandura 1986; Bartels 2007; Li and Yang
2009). Alter and Forgas’ (2007) findings may suggest that
such tendencies concerning low SSE may be even more
pronounced during a positive mood. The authors made
their participants doubt their abilities and found that par-
ticipants engaged in auto-handicapping behavior while in a
positive mood as compared to those in neutral and negative
moods. According to the authors, this strategy was used in
order to protect participants’ mood against the conse-
quences of failure.
Based on assumptions regarding expectancies of low
versus high SSE individuals in a positive mood, we
expected that the effect of SSE on mood and cognitive
performance should be more pronounced for positive rel-
ative to the other mood groups. Specifically, cognitive
performance among individuals with high SSE should be
enhanced while performance for those with low SSE
should be impaired.
We also predicted that cognitive performance among
individuals in the negative mood and control conditions
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would be less affected by SSE than performance of indi-
viduals in the positive mood condition. This is because
individuals in negative or neutral moods are experiencing a
different situation from participants in a positive mood. In
comparison to the positive mood participants, individuals
in the negative or neutral moods should find more tasks
rewarding. When these individuals engage in whatsoever
activity, they might experience an improved mood. When
participants in a positive mood engage in the same activity,
it is more likely to deteriorate their pleasant mood.
Therefore, according to Wegener and Petty’s model, indi-
viduals in the negative and neutral mood conditions might
not even analyze the ongoing activity’s consequences to
their mood as compared to the positive mood participants
(Wegener and Petty 1994; Wegener et al. 1995). Hence,
motivation among individuals in negative and neutral
moods should be less dependent on whether the task is
satisfying and whether they feel efficacious. Accordingly,




Participants were 67 students from the College of Man-
agement ‘‘Edukacja’’ and 72 students from the University
of Wrocław, for a total of 139 students. This included 58
men (42 %) and 81 women, aged 19–50 years (M = 24.44;
SD = 6.88). All participants volunteered and were not paid
for their participation.
Procedure
The study was carried out in various groups of 10–20
participants. Each group was randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: positive mood, negative mood, and con-
trol condition. The study included just one session lasting
approximately 45 min. In the two experimental conditions
(positive vs. negative mood), participants were informed
that they were taking part in two studies. The first study
was introduced as examining perception of film clips and
the second study as research on reading comprehension.
Two experimenters conveyed the impression that there
were indeed two studies. In fact, both studies constituted
one experiment, with the first part inducing the specific
mood and the second part measuring SSE, mood, and
performance. The purpose of this design was to obscure the
true aims of the study, which was to examine the impact of
mood on task performance. Previous experiments assessing
the influence of mood on cognitive performance employed
a similar procedure (Bless et al. 1996; Martin et al. 1993;
Wegener et al. 1995), with the mood induction as an
independent task. There was no mood manipulation in the
control condition, but other variables were measured in the
same order as in the experimental groups (i.e., SSE, mood
measure, and reading comprehension performance).
Mood induction
In the experimental conditions, the first experimenter told
participants that his study explored perception of film clips.
The experimenter then presented 7-min films. In the posi-
tive mood condition, the film showed a French comedic
performance recorded with a hidden camera. In the nega-
tive mood condition, the film presented the hunger problem
in Africa. A pilot study was conducted to ensure that these
films actually induced the intended moods. Results of this
pilot study (N = 74) confirmed mood manipulation effec-
tiveness. Participants watching the positive mood-inducing
film experienced a significantly higher positive mood than
did participants watching the negative mood-inducing film,
F(2, 71) = 10.25; p = .002; g2 = .13. Next, participants
completed a buffer scale designed to convince them that
the study indeed explored film perception. The scale
included such statements as ‘‘When watching the film, I
was identifying myself with one of the main characters’’
and ‘‘I watch films like this frequently.’’ The participants
were asked to rate each statement on a four-point scale
from 1 (‘‘I definitely agree’’) to 4 (‘‘I definitely disagree’’).
Afterwards, the first experimenter thanked participants for
their participation. He then left the room and the other
experimenter entered, who told participants that the second
study would assess reading comprehension. As there was
no mood manipulation for the control group, control par-
ticipants only performed the second part of the study.
Specific self-efficacy (SSE) questionnaire
A questionnaire assessing SSE related to reading compre-
hension was created specifically for the present study. It
was based on the assumption that SSE consists of partici-
pants’ beliefs that they could mobilize cognitive resources,
motivation, and courses of action needed to meet situa-
tional demands (Wood and Bandura 1989). Thus, the
questionnaire contained four statements referring to par-
ticipants’ ability to mobilize resources toward accom-
plishing the reading comprehension tasks (‘‘Despite putting
in the effort, I am often not good at reading comprehen-
sion.’’ [reversed], ‘‘Reading comprehension comes easy to
me,’’ ‘‘My ability to read with understanding is at a satis-
factory level,’’ ‘‘If I really try, I can read and comprehend
material very well’’). Participants had to rate to what extent
they related to these statements using a six-point scale from
1 (‘‘I definitely disagree’’) to 6 (‘‘I definitely agree’’);
500 Motiv Emot (2015) 39:498–505
123
Cronbach’s a = .77; average inter-correlation r = .46. A
pilot study revealed that results of this questionnaire cor-
related with reading comprehension task performance
(r = .30; p\ .001). These results match those observed in
other studies (Chen et al. 2000; Gupta et al. 2013).
Mood-manipulation checks
After completing the SSE scale, participants rated their
mood on a scale used in previous studies (Lachowicz-
Tabaczek and S´niecin´ska 2014). The goal was to assess
mood manipulation effects. The scale was similar to those
implemented by other researchers (Bless et al. 1996;
Martin et al. 1993; Wegener et al. 1995). Similarly, like in
Martin et al. experiment, the questionnaire contained 13
mood states (e.g., worried, amused, happy, relaxed, tensed,
depressed, etc.), a greater number than was assessed in
Bless’ et al. and Wegener’s and Petty’s studies. Partici-
pants were asked to rate how much they felt each adjective
on a 9-point scale from 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 9 (‘‘fully’’), as in
Bless’ et al. and Wegener’s and Petty’s experiments.
Answers for negative mood items were summed and sub-
tracted from the positive mood items to get a total mood
score (Cronbach’s a = 0.84). Higher scores indicated a
more positive mood.
Cognitive task
Participants next performed the reading comprehension
task to assess cognitive performance. Participants first read
a text containing about 4,500 characters addressing issues
related to environmental protection. After reading the text,
participants answered 16 multiple-choice questions. Each
question had four possible answers. For each item where
participants chose the correct answers and omitted all
incorrect answers, participants received 4 points, resulting
in a maximum of 64 points (i.e., a total of four points per
item). Participants were fully debriefed afterwards.
Results
Mood-manipulation checks
The manipulation was effective. We conducted a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the three experimental
conditions (positive mood, negative mood, control) as the
independent variable and mood as the dependent variable.
Results revealed a significant main effect of mood condi-
tion in the expected direction, F(2, 136) = 17.99,
p\ .001, g2 = .21. Planned comparisons revealed that
participants in the positive mood group rated their mood as
significantly higher (M = 26.25), F(2, 136) = 6.74,
p = .01, g2 = .05, while participants in the negative mood
group rated their mood as significantly lower (M = 7.08),
F(2, 136) = 10.51, p = .002, g2 = .07, than participants
in the control group (M = 18.26).
Because the SSE measure was administered after the
mood manipulation, we had to make sure that the mood
manipulation did not influence SSE scale results. Thus, we
conducted another one-way ANOVA in which the three
experimental conditions were again the independent vari-
able, while the dependent variable was SSE scale results.
There was no main effect of experimental condition, F(2,
136) = 1.2, ns, g2 = .02. Planned comparisons also
revealed no differences between groups regarding SSE:
positive mood group (M = 18.2) versus negative (M =
17.16), F(2, 136) = 2.39, ns, g2 = .02, and control group
(M = 17.76), F(2, 136) = .46, ns, g2 = .003.
To check also the independence of SSE and mood
results, we calculated the correlation between these two
variables, which turned out to be non-significant (r = .05,
ns). We then conducted a regression analysis to examine the
effect of SSE in interaction with mood manipulation on
mood results. Two contrast-coded variables were created.
The first contrast was C1; this contrast compared the posi-
tive mood group (coded as ‘‘2/3’’) with the negative mood
and control groups (each coded as ‘‘-1/3’’). The second
contrast was C2, which compared the negative mood with
the control group (negative mood group coded as ‘‘-1/2’’;
control group coded as ‘‘1/2’’; positive mood group coded
as ‘‘0’’) (Cohen et al. 2003). The independent variables were
SSE (mean-centered), experimental condition (in two con-
trast-coded variables), and interactions between SSE and
experimental conditions. The dependent variable was mood
score. Results revealed that neither the interaction between
C1 and SSE (B = .48, SE = .84, t(133) = .57, ns) nor the
interaction between C2 and SSE (B = .19, SE = 1.18,
t(133) = .16, ns) influenced mood results.
Cognitive performance
A regression analysis was conducted to verify our
hypotheses concerning the moderating role of SSE in mood
effects on task performance. Contrast coding was used to
code all conditions. The experimental conditions were
transformed into two contrast-coded variables. The first
contrast was C1, which compared the positive mood group
(coded as ‘‘2/3’’) with the negative mood and control
groups (each coded as ‘‘-1/3’’). The second contrast was
C2, which compared the negative mood with the control
group (negative mood group coded as ‘‘-1/2’’; control
group coded as ‘‘1/2’’; positive mood group coded as ‘‘0’’)
(Cohen et al. 2003). In each case, SSE (mean-centered) and
experimental conditions were entered in Step 1, while
interactions between these variables were entered in Step 2.
Motiv Emot (2015) 39:498–505 501
123
The dependent variable was cognitive performance score
(i.e., reading comprehension). The regression results are
presented in Table 1.
The Step 1 analysis showed a significant main effect of SSE
(B = .65, SE = .18, t(135) = 3.68, p\ .001) but no signif-
icant main effects based on coded variables: C1 (B = -.16,
SE = 1.16, t(135) = -.14; ns) and C2 (B = .98, SE = 1.5,
t(135) = .65; ns). The Step 2 analysis revealed a significant
interaction between SSE and C1 (B = .88, SE = .36,
t(133) = 2.47, p\ .02) but no interaction between SSE and
C2 (B = -.24, SE = .5, t(133) = -.48; ns).
Simple slopes tests showed that, as hypothesized, SSE
was a positive predictor of cognitive performance only for
participants who were in a positive mood; higher SSE
predicted enhanced cognitive performance (B = 1.08,
SE = .25, t(133) = 4.36, p\ .001). SSE did not affect the
other groups’ cognitive performance (negative mood
group, B = .09, SE = .38, t(133) = .24, ns; control group,
B = .33, SE = .32, t(133) = 1.02, ns).
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of experimental condition on
cognitive performance among the higher (?1 SD) and lower
(-1 SD) SSE individuals. Cognitive performance among
higher SSE individuals (?1 SD) was significantly better in the
positive mood condition than in the other two conditions
(B = .88, SE = .36, t(133) = 2.47, p\ .02). Lower SSE
individuals (-1 SD) had lower cognitive performance in the
positive mood condition than in the other two conditions
(B = .88, SE = .35, t(133) = 2.47, p\ .02).
Discussion
The current results support our hypothesis that SSE mod-
erates cognitive performance among individuals in a
positive mood. Participants with high SSE experiencing a
positive mood achieved the highest cognitive performance
among all groups. Because of a high SSE, these partici-
pants likely anticipated success on the task related to their
SSE. As success can maintain their positive mood, these
individuals became more motivated to perform, even more
so than others with high SSE, which leads them to out-
perform other high SSE individuals.
Conversely, individuals with low SSE are more likely to
anticipate failure during activities from their SSE area. To
maintain a positive mood, these individuals might adopt a
strategy that protects against failure such as avoiding
engagement in the task performance. This could explain
why low SSE individuals in a positive mood performed
worse on the task as compared to low SSE participants in
other moods. As a result, individuals in a positive mood
with a low SSE level obtained the lowest cognitive per-
formance among all groups.
As individuals in a positive mood performed best when
SSE was high and worst when low, SSE appears to be a
valid moderator affecting cognitive performance when in a
positive mood. In contrast to previously described moder-
ators, suggesting more temporary influencers (Bless et al.
1996; Martin et al. 1993; Wegener et al. 1995; Ziegler
2014), SSE appears to be more of a trait-based factor
influencing the relationship between mood and cognitive
performance (Gupta et al. 2013; Low et al. 2005).
Alternative interpretations: The hedonic contingency
approach and performance and enjoyment-based stop
rules
One possible alternative explanation for different levels of
performance going with different levels of SSE in positive
Table 1 Regression analysis of mood and specific self-efficacy
(SSE) on cognitive task performance (reading comprehension)
Variable B SE
Step 1
Contrast 1: positive mood versus
negative mood and control groups
-.16 1.16





Contrast 1 -.16 1.14
Contrast 2 .64 1.49
SSE .50* .19*
Contrast 1 9 SSE .88* .36*
Contrast 2 9 SSE -.24 .50
SSE specific self-efficacy
* p\ .02
Fig. 1 Cognitive task performance as a function of experimental
condition and specific self-efficacy (SSE)
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mood might be that SSE changed the experience of the
task. For instance, participants high in SSE might have
liked the task more than participants low in SSE. This
alternative would be more in keeping with Wegener and
Petty’s hedonic contingency theory (Wegener et al. 1995),
which states that people in a positive mood do better on
tasks that they find enjoyable but worse on tasks they find
unpleasant. If so, task liking should function as a mediator
of the interactive effect of SSE and mood on performance
(i.e., in a positive mood, higher SSE should lead to higher
task liking which, in turn, should increase performance).
To assess this possibility, we conducted a follow-up study
that included a 4-item scale measuring the liking of reading
comprehension tasks (e.g., ‘‘I like reading comprehension
tasks,’’ with responses ranging from 1 ‘‘I definitely dis-
agree’’ to 8 ‘‘I definitely agree’’). Apart from that, in this
study we measured the same variables (with mood ques-
tionnaire shortened to 4 items and reading comprehension
test shortened to 6 questions) according to the same pro-
cedure as our main experiment. One hundred twenty-seven
participants took part in this study. First we calculated the
correlation between SSE and task liking, which turned out
to be moderate and significant (r = .66, p\ .001). Then,
we repeated the main analyses from our previous study.
The interaction between SSE (mean-centered) and positive
mood (calculated as a contrast comparing positive mood to
two other conditions; coded: ‘‘2/3’’ as positive mood and
‘‘-1/3’’ as two other groups) was significant (B = .21,
SE = .09, t(121) = 2.43, p\ .02), which replicated our
previous results. Meanwhile, when liking (mean-centered)
was placed into the regression equation, the interaction
between positive mood and performance remained signif-
icant (B = .21, SE = .09, t(120) = 2.39, p\ .02), and
inclusion of the liking variable into the regression equation
did not increase predictive power of the model (R2
Change\ .001, F(6, 120) Change = .09, ns). This result
proves that task liking did not mediate the effect of an
interaction between positive mood and SSE on task per-
formance. Thus, an alternative interpretation based on
hedonic contingency theory was not supported.
Actually, such findings refer also to alternative inter-
pretation basing on Martin and colleagues’ account (Martin
et al. 1993), suggesting that when in a positive mood, low
SSE participants might doubt their ability to perform well.
In effect, they might pursue a performance-based stop rule
using positive mood as a performance indicator. Con-
versely, high SSE individuals might like the task more and
apply an enjoyment-based stop rule. Therefore, when in a
positive mood, one should observe task liking mediating
the interaction effect between positive mood and SSE on
performance (an enjoyment-based stop rule). As described
above, the results of our follow-up study did not confirm
such an effect. As an enjoyment-based stop rule turned out
to be less likely for explaining the obtained results, we
cannot relate to the prediction coming from the perfor-
mance based stop rule postulated in Martin et al.’s model.
This is because we had no adequate measure for examining
performance concerns and its possible meditational influ-
ence on task results. Thus, to fully assess whether Martin
and colleagues’ model provides a possible alternative
interpretation for the present results, a ‘‘performance con-
cern’’ measure should be included in future research.
Concerning participants in the control and negative
mood groups, our analyses revealed they performed at the
same level regardless of SSE. Wegener and Petty’s hedonic
contingency theory (Wegener and Petty 1994; Wegener
et al. 1995) provides a valid explanation for these findings.
The authors state that when participants in a positive mood
engage in whatsoever activity, their current mood is more
likely to decrease since the mood can go nowhere but
down. In turn, when individuals in a negative or neutral
mood engage in that same activity, they would likely
improve or maintain their current mood. In other words,
engaging in whatsoever activity is most rewarding for
participants who are initially in a negative or neutral mood.
Therefore, those individuals might not even analyze the
consequences which an ongoing activity brings to their
mood. Thus, these participants likely would not base task
motivation on whether they found the current task satis-
fying and whether they will felt efficient performing it. For
this reason, SSE probably did not influence cognitive per-
formance among the control and negative mood groups.
Mood as a resource approach
The present results might also refer to interpretations
considering positive mood as a resource. Positive mood can
be beneficial for performance on activities related to social
interactions, health (Forgas 2006), creativity (Isen et al.
1987), and reading comprehension (Bohn-Gettler and Rapp
2011). However, the current findings somewhat contradict
the general idea that positive mood acts as a universally
positive resource. A similar conclusion came from Trope
et al. (2001) conclusions. Our results suggest that indi-
viduals in a positive mood might be less motivated to
perform tasks when experiencing low SSE. Thus, they
might try to avoid such tasks and would not benefit from a
positive mood as a resource. In addition, diminished per-
formance can further decrease these individuals’ SSE. A
continuous feedback loop develops, resulting in recurrent
decreases in SSE. Intrinsic motivation might also suffer, as
SSE is related to a need for competence, which is a basic
component of intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 2008).
One method for ceasing this negative feedback loop lies
within SSE. For instance, high SSE might encourage
individuals to engage in specific activities when in a
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positive mood. Performing the activity when in a positive
mood might improve outcomes, which could lead to
additional SSE enhancements.
Limitations and future directions
The generalization that individuals in a positive mood base
their motivation on SSE might be subject to additional
limitations. The first limitation is related to the importance
participants placed on the activity. If the task is not
important, success or failure might not modify one’s mood
(Frijda 1988). Therefore, SSE might not affect motivation
or performance even when individuals are in a positive
mood.
Furthermore, even when a certain activity is important
for the subject, for implementing a postulated mechanism
(i.e., basing motivation on SSE level in positive mood to
maintain that mood), individuals must possess some mood
regulation experience and know the activities in which they
are proficient. Therefore, young or less emotionally intel-
ligent individuals might not show the same moderating
effect of SSE, as their mood regulation ability is limited
(Chapman and Hayslip 2006).
Even when individuals have the ability to attain and
maintain a positive mood, in some cases they might not
apply it. Research suggests that there are certain activities
for which a neutral mood seems to be most beneficial
(Erber and Tesser 1992). Moreover, there are situational
(Stearns and Parrott 2012) and trait like factors (Tamir
2005) that might determine when individuals prefer being
in a negative mood.
We propose further experiments in which SSE could be
more directly manipulated. This would allow for more
justified causal explanations regarding SSE and its modu-
latory effect on the relationship between positive mood and
cognitive performance.
It is also important to obtain insight into the mecha-
nism(s) responsible for determining how a positive mood
affects cognitive performance. We postulate that this
mechanism likely refers to enhanced motivation among
high SSE individuals and diminished motivation among
low SSE individuals. These motivational factors could be
assessed by measuring cognitive phenomena, such as task
success value and task importance, while also examining
certain behavioral tendencies (e.g., auto-handicapping).
Future research should also examine support for the
notion that motivation based on SSE indeed maintains a
positive mood. This can be accomplished via a final mood
measure at the end of a research session, after cognitive
performance has been assessed.
Furthermore, apart from SSE, there might be additional
trait-like moderators of cognitive performance while in a
positive mood. For instance, neuroticism might be a
plausible moderator in that highly neurotic individuals
limit their information processing while in a positive mood
in order to avoid being exposed to worrisome material.
Thus, further explorations regarding trait-like moderators
of the impact of mood on cognitive performance are
promising perspectives.
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